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The makeup of the new European Commission was announced by Jean-Claude Juncker on 10
September. Following the announcement, Andrew Glencross writes on the constitutional
implications of the so-called Spitzenkandidaten process for the new Commission’s role. He argues
that the process could be understood as a parallel to the use of direct democracy in Switzerland or
a directly elected President in the United States to grant citizens a more direct connection with
fundamental constitutional change. However this form of ‘presidentialisation’ in the Commission’s
case is unlikely to bring about ‘bottom up’ constitutional agency overnight, particularly given the
indirect nature of Juncker’s appointment.
With the nominations and portfolios for Jean-Claude Juncker’s College of Commissioners now decided, it is a good
time to reflect on the broader dynamics at play in the creation of this new team. The appointment of Juncker himself
came on the back of the so-called Spitzenkandidaten process, whereby the party groups in the European Parliament
first selected representatives to be the leaders of their campaigns for the pan-EU elections in May 2014. Then, in
what David Cameron labelled a “back-door power-grab”, the European Parliament made it clear to the heads of
state and government in the European Council that the new Commission President would have to be the leader
(Spitzenkandidat) whose party family won the most seats. Hence the best way to analyse this development is as a
form of presidentialisation within the EU, potentially marking the transition to a new constitutional order.
The peculiar feature of the constitutional development of
the EU is precisely that it has taken place in the
absence of constitutional agency at a popular level.
Courts, notably through the jurisprudence of the Court of
Justice of the EU, as well as diplomats negotiating EU
treaties, have left their imprint on the legal rules and
institutional calibration underpinning ever closer union.
This is understandable in a context of gradual
integration between sovereign states, where the
overarching aim was to have cooperation replace
conflict. Indeed, the robustness of the EU’s legal order
combined with the scope of its shared policy
competences is remarkable compared with other
attempts at regional integration.
However, the origins of the Swiss Confederation or the
United States of America are not so dissimilar.
Constitutional cleavages in both countries were
dominated by questions of how much autonomy was
retained by states or cantons. Yet in Switzerland and in the United States a political mechanism for generating
bottom up constitutional agency eventually came into operation to help resolve constitutional debates without
recourse merely to courts or elite diplomacy. Significantly, these mechanisms were extra-parliamentary – direct
democracy (i.e. referendum) in the Swiss case, and presidentialisation for the US – because defining the Swiss or
the Americans as a single people was itself highly contested.
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What direct democracy and presidentialisation offer is the ability to link together citizens of different territories by
mobilising voters around a candidate or a particular policy issue. In this way, citizens demonstrate that they are part
of a shared political community through practice rather than by merely having representatives that sit in a common
chamber. This does not mean that legislatures become redundant, but that citizens can have a more direct
connection with fundamental constitutional change, notably regarding the boundaries between central authority and
unit autonomy.
Swiss voters have acted as constitutional agents in referendums, requiring a dual majority of both voters and of
cantons to pass, to determine constitutional issues such as membership of the UN and EU, women’s suffrage, and
federal welfare policy. Likewise, presidentialisation in the US created an office that had the popular legitimacy to
make decisive interventions in constitutional settlements over state rights and welfare policy, continuing to this day
for instance with Obamacare.
So how does EU-style presidentialisation compare when it comes to injecting constitutional agency? One hope was
that the Spitzenkandidaten would remedy an “elitist deficit” whereby popular views are under-represented in an
otherwise remote, technocratic body. But the end result, at odds with the increasingly Eurosceptic tenor of the
elections, was the appointment of Juncker: almost a caricature of an EU-insider from a small, Europhile country.
Moreover, the Commission President is not directly elected, which precludes a personal connection with the EU
electorate, while the presidency itself is not an office with the prerogatives needed to reconfigure the EU
constitutional order.
Nevertheless, presidentialisation does offer the potential for integrating a European demos by creating a new link
between the governed and governing. This will be most obvious in five years’ time, when party groups will again
have to select their Spitzenkandidaten. Voters at that point will have the power to sanction Juncker, or at least his
party family, for the policies pursued by the Commission. Equally important, future candidates for Commission
President will seek to develop further their transnational campaigns in order to establish a policy mandate. A
foretaste of this increased politicisation of the Commission via political contestation for the presidency can already
be seen in Juncker’s guidelines for his College of Commissioners. For instance, in response to critics of EU
austerity measures, he calls for a “social impact assessment” to be made whenever a new bailout is required for a
Eurozone country.
Hence it is far too much to expect that presidentialisation can engender constitutional agency overnight. The EU will
have to find its own method for allowing political contestation to legitimise the constitutional evolution of a polity with
changing boundaries between national autonomy and supranational competences. If the cross-national, partisan
fight for the Commission President is to mark a turning point in that process, it will probably be as one of several
ways of mobilising citizens around an increasingly politicised EU. In this context, citizens’ initiatives  for generating
policy proposals and the early warning mechanism that allows national parliaments to challenge legislative
proposals are also likely to be important. What matters most for the five years ahead is how far citizens feel their
political agency is taken into account as and when EU elites decide on what ever closer union really means in
practice.
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